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The proliferation of government-sponsored enterprises, or GSEs, has forever 
shaped the way in which the federal government of the United States ensures the 
provision of public goods and services. GSEs represent a hybrid or quasi-
govemm~ntal organization that is specific to the United States. In addition, GSEs are 
created by congressional or executive action but are privately-owned organizations 
that are charged with achieving a public goal while also seeking to earn a profit for its 
shareholders. GSEs function primarily as financial intermediaries that extend credit to 
underserved Americans in various types of markets. 
GSEs occupy a contentious position in the field of public administration; 
many critics attack the government's preference for GSEs as a threat to federalism, 
democracy, and government accountability. These critics ofGSEs attack the 
intrusion of private sector behavior and management styles into the public sector. 
The private sector style of management is represented by the Entrepreneurial 
Management Paradigm while the pubic sector style of management is represented by 
the Constitutionalist Management Paradigm. In this thesis, two GSEs--Fannie Mae 
and Freddie Mac-are utilized as framing this debate over GSEs. Moreover, the 
author identifies the legislation that led to the creation of GS Es and how current 
public law and Constitutional law affect the perception of GS Es. 
In addition, the debate over GSEs has been with more cries of accountability 
at the governmental level. Looking critically at these issues, the author argues that 
there is no clear consensus of the meaning of the word accountability when it is 
applied to GSEs. Furthermore, politicians and public managers too often conflate 
controllability as meaning accountability. 
Ultimately, it is concluded that GSEs are not likely to vanish from the federal 
government. On the contrary, in order to protect the division of powers, democracy, 
and ensure accountability, academics and administrators must reassess the term 
accountability and ensure ways to hold these hybrid organizations accountable. In the 
end, it is concluded that GSEs are neither a purely positive or negative aspect of 
modem federal government; rather they are integral parts of modern public 
administration that demand public administrators to reassess the meanings of 
accountability. 
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Introduction 
Government-sponsored enterprises, or GSEs, have forever shaped the way in 
which the federal government ensures the provision of public goods and services. 
Created over seventy years ago, these types of organizations have blossomed into 
major institutional actors at the federal level. Ranging from the provision of student 
loans for college to assisting new homeowners in acquiring a mortgage, the range of 
GSE activity can be felt in numerous aspects of society. While these organizations 
serve as a popular avenue for public good provision, the lasting influence of the 
federal government's reliance on these types of organizations has not received much 
attention outside the realm of academia. Nevertheless, the increasing reliance on 
GSEs has raised the attention of many critics who argue that the prevalence of such 
organizations represents a credible threat to federalism, popular sovereignty, and 
governmental accountability. 
By using arguably the most recognizable GSEs as a case study, Fannie Mae 
and Freddie Mac, this thesis analyzes the impact that GSEs have had on the federal 
government, its operations, and the accountability of its programs. In addition, this 
thesis investigates the effects of the private sector management practices being 
applied to the public sector. Moreover, this thesis argues that the term 
"accountability" possesses multiple facets more than simply controllability. In the 
end, it is concluded that GSEs are neither a purely positive or negative aspect of 
modem federal government; rather they are integral parts of modem public 
6 
administration that demand public administrators to reassess the meanings of 
accountability. 
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac: A Case Study 
7 
For many Americans, becoming a homeowner is part of the so-called 
"American Dream." Once an individual becomes a homeowner, this action takes on 
significant symbolic meaning for the individual and his or her family. The act of 
becoming a homeowner exists as a symbolic, ritualistic rite of passage into becoming 
an established member of a given community. For the children and grandchildren of 
recent immigrants, whose parents may have been forced to find shelter in crowded, 
decrepit ghettos with absentee landlords, the opportunity to purchase a home is a 
monumental occasion. Such an act is a chance for an individual to confront the 
discrimination that their parents and grandparents suffered under and to silence the 
power that these modes of discrimination once possessed. 
Besides representing a symbolic passage, homeownership is vital to 
communities everywhere for numerous reasons. First of all, the property taxes that 
homeowners pay to the city, county, state, and federal governments contribute to 
funding essential programs, especially public schools. As a corollary, it is no 
coincidence that many of the top-performing, fiscally healthy public schools are those 
schools that are located in or near areas where there is a high density of homeowners 
with significant property values. Secondly, studies have indicated that crime rates are 
substantially lower in areas designated with a high density of homeowners versus a 
community with a low density of homeowners. Homeownership also is an essential' 
factor in building community capacity and encouraging an active citizenry. 
8 
Recognizing the magnitude of the impact that homeownership has on the 
micro level of the individual and the macro level of the health of a community and 
region, various levels of government have made homeownership a primary target to 
achieve. The Community Reinvestme_nt Act of 1978 (CRA) forbade the practice of 
"redlining," in which banks would refuse to provide loans to individuals and families 
who resided in certain areas that were designated on a map as supposedly high-
default risk areas. 1 Moreover, the federal government provides numerous tax credits 
and incentives to first-time homebuyers to assist in the cost of purchasing a home. 
For example, this year alone, first-time homebuyers are eligible for an $8,000 tax 
credit that does not have to be repaid over the life of the mortgage. In addition to the 
prohibition of discriminatory lending practices and establishment of tax credits and 
incentives for first-time homebuyers, the federal government has created numerous 
organizations to provide citizens direct assistance in their quest to become a 
homeowner. Of these organizations, two provide the most direct mortgage assistance 
to potential homeowners: the Federal National Mortgage Association (better known 
as Fannie Mae) and the Federal Home Loan Corporation (better known as Freddie 
Mac). 2 
1 Gary Paul Green and Anna Haines, Asset Building & Community Development, 2"' edition, (Los 
Angeles: Sage, 2008), 152 
2 Jonathan Kopp ell, The Politics of Quasi-Government (New York: Cambridge University Press, 
2003), 187. 
9 
These mortgage loan giants known as Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac represent 
two of the nation's most prominent hybrid organizations. These organizations "are 
private, profit-seeking corporations created by Congress to serve a public purpose: 
increasing availability of credit to American home buyers while bringing stability and .,, 
liquidity to the financial sector."3 The storied past of these two hybrid organizations 
reveals insight into the current-day dispute over the function and regulation of these 
organizations. This section will cast the current-day dispute over the proper reach of 
these two organizations onto a historical backdrop and identify key developments in 
the evolution of these organizations that have led the controversy over what their 
proper roles should be. 
The history of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac can be traced back to the 
Depression era, when the federal government decided to create a secondary market 
for mortgages in 1938. The federal government created this secondary market so that 
banks could sell mortgages to "maintain their cash flow and allow the housing 
industry to stay afloat. "4 Prior to this creation, the federal government had passed the 
National Housing Act of 1934 and created the Federal Housing Administration as a 
means to "insure lenders against borrower default."5 In order to lift the United States 
out of the Depression, Congress enacted the legislation in an effort to stimulate the 
3 Koppell, 187. 
4 Debbie Kwiatoski and Dylan Skriloff, "Fannie and Freddie ... and You," Hudson Valley Business 
Journal, September 15, 2008, 23 -27, available from <http://wwws.morehead-
st.edu:2048/login?url-http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=f5h&AN=34704808&si 
te=ehost-live>; accessed 16 February 2009. 
5 Koppell, 189. 
housing market by spurring home sales and the construction of new homes, thereby 
causing a chain reaction in the economy. 6 
10 
Although Congress had planned for the National Housing Act of 1934 to bring 
the economy out of Depression, the short term recovery growth failed to take hold. 
' . 
As Jonathan Koppell notes, "Private mortgage associations were expected to purchase 
the mortgages from the lenders and hold them as investments. Such associations 
never materialized."7 (Koppell 189-90). As a result, in 1938, Congress created an 
office within the Reconstruction Finance Corporation with the sole purpose of 
purchasing these insured mortgages. Kopp ell notes the immediate impact of the 
creation of this office on the market for available mortgages: 
This office, eventually named the Federal National Mortgage 
Association (FNMA), purchased FHA-insured loans from private 
lenders. The federal government thus created a secondary mortgage 
market-a place for lenders to sell loans-thereby increasing the 
supply of money for yet more loans ... 8 
The FNMA, or Fannie Mae as it is more commonly known, provided the 
psychological reassurance that lenders needed to offer more loans to potential 
borrowers. Since the federal government had created this secondary market, lenders 
could offer loans to Fannie Mae and then allow Fannie Mae to offer these same loans 
to borrowers, creating a buffer of insurance against potentially cataclysmic defaults 
industry-wide. 
6 Koppel!, 189. 
'Koppel!, 189-90. 
8 Koppel!. 189 - 90. 
1 1 
Fannie Mae remained owned and operated by the federal government until 
1968 when it became a government-sponsored by enterprise, or GSE. 9 Many factors 
contributed to Fannie Mae emerging as a quasi-public entity. One of the main 
reasons was the pressure of restraining a ballooning federal budget. Musolf and 
Seidman note: 
Wanting to avoid the "vagaries of the total budget situation," President 
Johnson's Secretary of Housing and Urban Development urged that 
the Federal National Mortgage Association be converted form a 
mixed-ownership government corporation to a government-sponsored 
private enterprise. He argued that "By putting the secondary market 
operations outside of the Government, and thereby, outside of the 
budget, it would be possible for Fannie Mae to be more responsive to 
the needs, we believe, of the building and mortgage financing industry 
that it can be now." 10 
As a result, the federal government sold off all ownership of Fannie Mae to private 
owners and chartered it as a "fully private government-sponsored enterprise (Moe 
1983)." 11 Since 1968, Fannie Mae has existed and operated in the mortgage market 
as a government-sponsored enterprise. 
In addition to this government-sponsored enterprise, Fannie Mae's "much 
younger sibling," Freddie Mac, was created by Congress in 1970 to help serve the 
mortgage industry as well. 12 Specifically, Congress chartered the Federal Home 
Loan Mortgage Corporation as means "to purchase loans made by institutions that 
were part of the Federal Home Loan Bank System. Similar to the fate of its sister 
9 Kwiatoski and Skriloff, 23. 
10 Lloyd D. Musolf and Harold Seidman, "The Blurred Boundaries of Public Administration," Public 
Administration Review 40, no. 2 (March -April I 980): 127 0oumal online]; available from 
<http://www.jstor.org/stable/975622>; accessed 2 February 2009. 
11 Koppell, 189 - 90. 
12 Koppell, 47. 
organization, Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac was transformed into a private ownership 
GSE in 1989 following the savings and loan (S&L) crisis. 13 
How do Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac Function as GSEs? 
12 
As stated previously, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac operate as GSEs that 
create a secondary mortgage market in an effort to assist potential homeowners in 
acquiring loans. Since 1968, the mission of these GSEs has changed and they are 
"now charged by Congress and the President with extending credit opportunities to 
underserved communities while continuing to facilitate home purchases by middle-
class Americans." 14 In an effort to achieve these two goals, Fannie Mae and Freddie 
Mac operate in the following manner: 
GSEs, like Fannie and Freddie, operate by borrowing money (in the 
form of these securities they sell) at rates that are someplace in-
between what the US Treasury offers and what the private markets 
offer - typically anywhere from 25 - 50 basis points ( or ¼ to ½ 
percent) lower than a private market would be able to offer. These 
lowered rates are partially passed on to homeowners in the form of a 
break on their mortgage rate. 15 
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac serve as intermediaries between the borrower and 
lender by establishing a secondary market for mortgages. Without the presence of 
GSEs like Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, a first-time home buyer with a low or non-
existent credit score may not be able to secure a loan directly from a private lender 
due to the fear of the lender that this individual, who possesses little or no credit 
13 Koppell, 189 - 90. 
14 Koppell, 47. 
15 Kwiatoski and Skriloff, 23. 
13 
rating, may not be able to make his or her monthly mortgage payments and may 
eventually default on the loan payments. In addition, if this individual were actually 
to receive a mortgage loan from a lender, the interest rate at which the individual 
receives the loan would be higher to reflect the lender's concern over the default risk. 
With the entrance of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac into the mortgage market, these 
GSEs buy loans from private lenders and pool these investments into a portfolio. 
Moreover, the two GSEs also combine these mortgages and create mortgage-backed 
securities which they sell in tum to private investors. 16 As a result of pooling their 
investments together, these hybrid organizations spread out the default risk and are 
able to provide mortgages to individuals at a lower rate than otherwise possible. 
Since Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac purchase these mortgage investments 
from private lenders then tum around and offer homebuyers these loans at lower 
rates, the federal government in effect is expressing an implicit guarantee that it will 
cover any bad debts incurred by the sale of mortgages to individuals who default on 
their loans. In other words, this implicit guarantee is the "idea that the U.S. Treasury 
would backstop these agencies in the event of a real financial collapse." This implicit 
guarantee explains some of the major reasons why foreign investors and foreign 
countries such as China, Japan, and Russia have purchased these mortgage-backed 
securities. Due in large part to the implicit backing of their debts by the federal 
government, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mao currently "underwrite nearly half of all 
16 Koppel!, 29. 
14 
mortgages" and possess approximately $5.2 trillion worth ofmortgages. 17 Their 
prominence in the mortgage industry led to a combined net income for the two GSEs 
in 2001 of greater than $10 billion. Out of the "Fortune 500" companies in 2002, 
Fannie Mae rankec\ second in total assets and Freddie Mac placed at sixth in total ,. 
assets. 18 
Two Basic Regulations of-Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac 
Due to their unique status as GSEs, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac enjoy 
several benefits of being a congressionally-chartered, privately-owned corporation. 
As with other GSEs, one of the major benefits of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac is that 
these hybrid organizations are not subject to the same laws and regulations of other 
governmental agencies. Because GSEs are instrumentalities of the federal 
government and not federal agencies by definition, they are not subject to the same 
restraints as agencies as defined by U.S. Code. 19 Furthermore, Fannie Mae and 
Freddie Mac are "exempt from state and local taxes, exempt from the registration 
requirements of the Securities and Exchange Commission, and have a $2.25 billion 
line of credit with the United States Treasury."20 Another benefit is that due to the 
implicit backing by the federal government, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac pay rates 
on borrowed money that are close to the level that the federal government itself pays 
17 K wiatoski and Skriloff, 23. 
18 Koppell, 188. 
19 Ronald C. Moe, "The Emerging Federal Quasi Government: Issues of Management and 
Accountability," Public Administration Review 61, no. 3 (May - June 2001 ): 295 Oournal online ]; 
available from <http://www.jstor.org/stable/977601>; accessed 2 February 2009. 
20 Koppell, 187. 
to borrow money. 21 Existing as a privately-owned company that enjoys implicit 
backing by the federal government, 
... Fannie and Freddie have all the advantages possessed by our 
fictitious entities and none of the disadvantages. It is not surprising 
that Fannie and Freddie generally resisted calls for their complete 
"privatization," severing the remaining ties to the federal 
government. 22 
15 
As GSEs, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac are privately-owned and profit 
seeking organizations that are subject to only two main governmental regulations. 
One of the regulations ensures that the two GS Es are operating "in a fiscally prudent 
manner" to prevent the scenario of an actual "bail out" by the federal government. 
Second, these GSEs, while they are privately-owned entities that seek to provide its 
shareholders a return on their investments; thyy still must adhere to the original 
purpose charged to them by Congress and the President. 23 
The 1992 FHEFSSA Law 
In 1992, Congress passed the Federal Housing Enterprises Financial Safety 
and Soundness Act (FHEFSSA) in response to the criticism for more regulation of 
GSEs following the wake up of the S&L crisis in 1989.24 In light of the fallout from 
the S&L bailout, attention was brought to Congress about the substantial fiscal 
liability that off-budget GSEs pose to the U.S. Treasury. As a result, legislation was 
included in the 1989 S&L bailout law that called for "a study of the government's 
21 Koppell, 29. 
22 Koppell, 103. 
23 Koppell, 29 - 30. 
24 Koppell, 47. 
16 
GSE liability." These subsequent reports eventually led to the passing of the 
FHEFSSA in 1992. 25 This legislation separated regulatory authority over Fannie 
Mae and Freddie Mac into two different organizations: the Department of Housing 
and Urban Development (HUD) and the Office of Federal Housing Enterprise 
Oversight (OFHEO). For HUD, this organization would have oversight over 
"programmatic regulations" of the two GSEs; i.e., HUD ensures that Fannie Mae and 
Freddie Mac adhere to their public purposes of extending credit to underserved 
communities and selling mortgages. The OFHEO is "responsible for safety and 
soundness regulation;" the OFHEO provides monitoring of capital reserves and 
ensures that Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac are not exposed to extreme financial risk. 26 
Specifically, the 1992 FHEFSSA mandated two separate capital regulations 
that OFHEO enforced. The first of the regulations is the minimum capital 
requirement, which is percentage of capital as a certain proportion of their liabilities 
that Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac must have on reserve. Secondly, the 1992 
legislation created a "risk-based capital requirement," which is a fluid amount of 
reserves that the GSEs must have on hand. The amount is flexible and based upon a 
"computerization" model which is used to "simulate the effects of massive downturns 
in the economy on Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac." This risk-based amount changes 
depending on the debt obligations of each organization in every quarter. 27 As of 
2008, the OFHEO was dismantled and its regulatory duties reassigned per the 
25 Koppel!, I 07. 
26 Koppel!, 4 7. 
27 Koppel!, 49. 
legislation within the 2008 Housing Recovery Act. 28 This legislation will be 
addressed later in the thesis. 
A Conflict Among GSE Purposes? 
As previously alluded to, GSEs have three objectives. The first objective is 
"to fulfill programmatic policy purposes." The second purpose ofGSEs is "to 
maintain a financially safe and sound operation that minimizes risk to the federal 
government." Thirdly, GSEs are "to operate as a profitable private company that 
maintains consistent return to shareholders." In his text The Politics ofQuasi-
Government, Koppell notes that "each objective is potentially in conflict with the 
other two. "29 Figure 1 below represents the "triangular model of interests" as it 
appears in Koppell' s text. 








As illustrated in the figure above, the obtainment of one of the objectives may 
preclude the two other objectives from being met. For example, as GSEs, Fannie 
28 United States Government Printing Office, Housing and Economic Recovery Act o/2008 
(Washington, D.C.: GPO, 2008), 141. 
29 Koppell, I 04. 
30 Koppell, I 04. 
17 
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Mae and Freddie Mac are privately-owned corporations, in which the management of 
both hybrid organizations is charged with making wise investments that yield a return 
for the shareholders of both GSEs. Although profit seeking is a viable and 
appropriate goal fo; GS Es, the management of these organizations cannot seek 
profitability at all costs. Depending on the conditions of the economy, an investment 
that yields high returns in the short run may reverse its course and hand down heavy 
losses that endanger the financial safety and soundness of the organization. 
Moreover, while offering mortgages in primarily popular, high-demand locations may 
generate a higher return for a particular GSE, concentrating mortgages in such areas 
prohibits the organizations from extending much needed loans to underserved 
communities. 
While GSEs such as Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac enjoy distinct benefits from 
their classification as GSEs, this very classification creates the potential for 
conflicting organizational objectives. Such organizations demand effective 
managerial leadership that understands the opposing pull of private sector objectives 
and governmental mandates. Furthermore, effective leadership of GSEs demands that 
public administrators and managers of quasi-governmental organizations reassess 
what the term accountability entails when it is applied to the world of GSEs. 
Privatizing Profit and Socializing Risk? 
GSEs, especially Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, have come under intense 
scrutiny for their potential financial risk to the U.S. Treasury. Many critics ofGSEs 
19 
argue that organizations such as Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac enjoy a unique status 
that allows them to privatize their profit but socialize their risk. 31 In other words, 
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac have the opportunity to enjoy profitable returns on their 
investments, but th~ implicit backing by the federal government changes the manner 
in which these GSEs behave in the marketplace. Critics add that this implicit backing 
entices GSEs to partake in riskier investments than they would otherwise without the 
backing of the federal government. Although certainly not a desirable position to find 
themselves, in theory Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac could fall back on the federal 
government to fulfill their debt obligations if they no longer existed as solvent 
corporations. 
The subprime mortgage crisis of 2008 intensified the debate over the proper 
role of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac in the mortgage securities industry. Previous to 
2008, more and more private mortgage companies had entered the booming industry 
since 200 I. 32 The entrance of these private mortgage companies, along with the 
presence of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, forever changed the mortgage industry 
within the U.S. The drive of private mortgage companies to earn a profit coupled 
with objective of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac to increase homeownership across the 
nation created a "perfect storm" that eventually sent the mortgage industry into a 
violent tailspin. Prior to the explosion of private mortgage companies into the 
31 Moe, Emerging Federal, 295. 
32 Roger Lowenstein, ''No Free Bubble," NY Times, 27 July 2008, MM! 3; available from 
<http://www.nytimes.com/2008/07/27/magazine/27wwln-lede-
t.html? r=l&scp=J&sq=lowenstein%20free%20bubble&st=cse>; accessed 16 February 2009. 
20 
market, banks controlled most of mortgage lending. As a result, banks relied upon 
four criteria for determining mortgage loans: "(!) how much income you had 
(documented); (2) what your down payment was; (3) your credit history; and (4) the 
assessed value of the home." 33 Kwiatoski and Skriloff(2008) write that: 
Banks - who used to do all the lending before mortgage brokers came 
on the scene - could 'dial up or dial down' any particular category to 
see if they felt comfortable giving a home loan .... The rise of the 
private mortgage industry and all sorts of new products - that were 
sliced and diced and monetarized into investment offerings - gave rise 
to the subprime loan, which was largely based upon just one thing; 
your credit score. 34 
With the explosion of available mortgages, private mortgage companies began 
to offer increasing amounts of mortgages to individuals based mostly upon their 
credit score-while turning a blind eye to insufficient incomes. Critics claim that this 
phenomenon combined with the mission of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac to promote 
homeownership overextended the housing market; in short, the push by private 
investors and policy makers to "encourage more housing than markets will support" 
resulted in "mortgages that [failed]."35 In addition, other critics indicate that 
reactionary policy to the initial subprime fallout exacerbated the crisis. At a time 
when Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac ought to have been reassessing their financial 
solvency, the U.S. government encouraged even more mortgages, further 
complicating the mortgage crisis. 36 
33 Kwiatoski and Skriloff, 25. 
34 Kwiatoski and Skriloff, 25. 
35 Lowenstein, MM 13. 
36 Lowenstein, MM 13. 
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Critics for GSE reform have been clamoring in Washington for over twenty 
years, arguing among other points that the exceptional status of GSEs like Fannie 
Mae and Freddie Mac expose the nation to extreme financial liability in the event of a 
severe economic dpwnturn. Some of the detractors included members of former 
,• 
President Reagan's administration, who staunchly believed that federal support of 
GSEs distorts market conditions. While some activists in the Reagan administration 
may have sought to abolish Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac entirely, such an action 
never came into fruition. 37 Since the objective of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac is to 
promote homeownership, the prevalence of their objectives in the public mindset of 
Americans allows these GSEs to "wrap themselves in the flag;" i.e., any attacks on 
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac can be "politically costly."38 As mentioned previously, 
the status that Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac enjoy as GSEs allow them to lobby 
Congress and construct a significant network of relations between influential 
politicians and other interest groups. 39 Still, the concern over exposing the taxpayers 
to substantial financial loss at the hands of Fannie Mae and Freddie M!)c and the 
mortgage crisi_s led to the passage of the Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 
2008. This act changed the regulatory structure of both Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac 
considerably. 
37 Ronald C. Moe and Thomas H. Stanton, "Government-sponsored Enterprises as Federal 
Instrumentalities: Reconciling Private Management with Public Accountability," Public 
Administration Review 49, no. 4 (July-August 1989): 322 [journal online]; available from 
<http://www.jstor.org/stable/97684 l>; accessed 2 February 2009. 
38 Koppell, 10 I. 
39 Koppell, 89 - 90. 
22 
The Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008 
Signed into law by former President Bush on July 30, 2008, the Housing and 
Economic Recovery Act brought with it drastic changes to the function of the Federal 
Housing Administration (FHA), as well the function and regulatory structure of the 
• 
GSEs Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. While the legislation is expansive, this thesis 
will focus on the portion of legislation that deals with the function and regulatory 
structure of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. 
In 1992, Congress passed the Federal Housing Enterprises Financial Safety 
and Soundness Act (FHEFSSA) that created the Office of Federal Housing Enterprise 
Oversight (OFHEO) as a regulatory agency within the Department of Housing and 
Urban Development. Prior to the passage of the Housing and Economic Recovery 
Act (further denoted as the Reform Act), OFHEO was charged with the task of 
ensuring that Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac adhered to specific capital reserve 
mandates as well as risk-based capital requirements that varied depending upon the 
prevailing market conditions. The Federal Housing Finance Regulatory Reform Act 
of2008 drastically changed the regulatory structure of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac 
by completely dismantling the OFHEO. The reform act replaced the OFHEO with 
the Federal Housing Finance Agency who is led by a single Director. The legislation 
granted the Director of the Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA) authority over 
Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and the Federal Home Loan Banks (FHLBs). The FHFA 
23 
was created as an independent agency of the federal government. 40 The Director of 
the FHF A is appointed by the President with the consent of the Senate and serves a 
term of five years. In addition, the legislation separates the duties of the agency to 
Deputy Directors in charge of the Division of Enterprise Regulation and Housing 
Mission and Goals.41 Some critics contend that the new regulatory agency 
overseeing Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac will impose higher capital requirements and 
increase the risk-based capital assessment level for these GSEs. 42 
In addition to creating a separate agency to regulate the actions of Fannie Mae 
and Freddie Mac, the Reform Act also created within FHF A an Office of Inspector 
General and an Office of the Ombudsman. As stated within the legislation, the Office 
of the Ombudsman will be "responsible for considering complaints and 
appeals ... regarding any matter relating to the regulation and supervision of such 
regulated entity by the Agency. "43 
One of the most controversial features of the Reform Act is Section 1117, 
which authorizes the Secretary of the Treasury the temporary authority "to purchase 
any obligations and other securities" of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.44 Numerous 
critics of GSEs cite this action as nothing more than a bailout of private parties via the 
taxpayers' money. On the other hand, others have noted that this provision in Section 
40 Housing Act, 8. 
41 Housing Act, 9. 
42 Jim DeMasi, "GSE Refonn Legislation: Implications for the Investment Portfolio," Community 
Banker 17, no. 9, (September 2008): 51 [journal online]; available from <http://wwws.morehead-
st.edu:204Bnogin?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direcFtrue&db=f5h&AN=343l2686&si 
te=ehost-live>; accessed 5 April 2009. 
43 Housing Act, 14. 
44 Housing Act, 30. 
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1117 of the Reform Act is nothing more than an explicit reassurance of the federal 
government's implicit guarantee to serve as financial lifeline for Fannie Mae and 
Freddie Mac in an effort to sustain a failing mortgage industry by providing the 
necessary capital for lenders and borrowers.45 This temporary authorization of the 
Secretary of the Treasury lasts until the end of 2009, and in order for the Secretary to 
purchase this debt, the Secretary "must make an emergency determination that the 
action is necessary to stabilize markets, prevent disruptions in mortgage availability, 
and protect the taxpayer. " 46 
Section 1125 of the Reform Act mandate~ that the Director of the FHF A meet 
with Congress on an annual basis to discuss the housing and the mortgage industry, as 
well as requiring the Director to conduct monthly surveys of mortgages markets. 47 
The legislation also amends the Federal National Mortgage Association Charter Act 
and the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation Act to set forth increased loan 
limitations for Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.48 Moreover, the Reform Act also 
requires Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac to register their securities with Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC). 49 Prior to passage of the Housing and Economic 
Recovery Act, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac were not legally obligated to register 
their securities with the SEC since they are GSEs. The Recovery Act amended the 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 to include Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and the 
45 Kwiatoski and Skriloff, 23. 
46 DeMasi, 50. 
47 Housing Act, 40. 
48 Housing Act, 38. 
49 Housing Act, 24. 
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Federal Home Loan Banks under these new registration requirements. 50 This section 
of the Recovery Act legislation removes a portion of the benefits that Fannie Mae and 
Freddie Mac once enjoyed due to their status as GSEs. 
In general, the Housing and Economic Recovery Act of2008 introduced 
sweeping changes into the administrative structure and regulatory structure of Fannie 
Mae and Freddie Mac. In response to the collapse of the mortgage crisis, lawmakers 
sought ways to reign in Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac and stave off further 
foreclosures. Senate Banking Committee Chairman Christopher Dodd (D-
Connecticut) stated, "By ... reforming the GSEs so they are better able to fulfill their 
mission of providing affordable housing options, this bill addresses the root of our 
current economic problems-the foreclosure crisis-and takes a step in the right 
direction toward getting our economy back on track." MBA Chairman P. Quinn 
adds: 
The GSEs need strong regulatory oversight to ensure they operate in a 
safe and sound manner, consistent with their charters. Further, we 
believe the GSEs ought to be subject to reasonable affordable-housing 
goals that do not distort the market .... The proposal to allow FHA to 
assist troubled borrowers has the potential to help stabilize markets 
and avoid foreclosures. We want to ensure there are appropriate 
safeguards to help deserving borrowers while keeping the program 
voluntary for lenders. 51 
50 Housing Act, 24. 
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The Recovery Act represents a significant step towards ensuring more accountability 
from GSEs like Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. Lawmakers recognized the criticisms 
of the lack of accountability of GSEs and the fact that the FHEFSSA of 1992 simply 
did not provide s!ri_c::t enough guidelines for Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac to operate 
in manner that was both profitable and prudent in the long run. The dismantling of 
the OFHEO and the subsequent creation of the FHFA created a more direct line of 
managerial accountability from the President to the actions of Fannie Mae and 
Freddie Mac in the mortgage industry. The Recovery Act does not shoestring these 
GSEs from pursuing rational investment opportunities that will yield a profit to their 
shareholders. Nor does this legislation explicitly guarantee that the federal 
government will backstop these GSEs in the event of an economic collapse of the 
mortgage industry. 52 On the contrary, the Recovery Act increases the programmatic 
accountability of the public functions of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. The monthly 
surveys, annual congressional meetings, and the new SEC requirements should help 
ensure that these GSEs will pursue investments that are not only profitable but also 
provide stability in the housing sector. In addition, the increase in the capital reserve 
requirements as well the risk-based capital requirements will help prevent the 
mortgage market from becoming overly saturated. 
52 DeMasi, 51. 
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Hybrid Organizations and GSEs - History, Form, Function, & Criticism 
Governments provide goods and services for the taxpayers who fund them. 
These goods and services range from defense from foreign nations to reduced school 
lunches to providing safe drinking water to providing funding assistance for higher 
I 
education. Throughout the history of the United States, each level of federal, state, 
and local governments have delivered such public goods and services through various 
means. For many services, the government itself provides the service directly to its 
constituency through its many agencies. Alternatively, the last eighty years have 
witnessed an unprecedented proliferation of nonprofit and private companies 
involved what were once solely government actions. The intertwining of the global 
economies has accelerated this proliferation as well as attempts by several presidents 
at "New Federalism:" 
Contracting for government services has become increasingly popular 
in the U.S., both across the levels of government and policy arenas. 
Recent "devolution" of selected program responsibilities from the 
federal to state f overnments has accelerated this trend - especially for 
social service. 5 
What was once the sole domain for the government is now witnessing the inclusion of 
nonprofits, private business, and hybrid organizations known as government-
sponsored enterprises, or GSEs. Specifically, within in the U.S., the federal 
government has been relying upon some forms of GSEs to provide goods and 
53 Jocelyn M. Johnston and Barbara S. Romzek, "Contracting and Accountability -A Model of 
Effective Contracting Drawn from the U.S. Experience," in Unbundled Government: A Critical 
Analysis of the Global Trend to Agencies, Quangos and Contractualisation, ed. Christopher Pollitt and 
Colin Talbot (New York: Routledge, 2004), 94. 
services to the public since the Great Depression. 54 GS Es represent a unique 
combination of public and private interests that are created to provide stability to a 
given market. The following section is an analysis of the American GSEs in their 
role of providing services to the public and how their creation has permanently 
altered governmental and organizational accountability. 
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Public administrators trace the origins of GSEs back to several enterprises that 
were created as a result of the Great Depression in the 193 Os. 55 In an effort to correct 
the market failures and resuscitate the economy, President Roosevelt and Congress 
created numerous enterprises that later became known as an "alphabet soup of 
entities." Some of these enterprises included the Export-Import Bank (Exim), the 
Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA), and the Federal Crop Insurance Corporation. 
Many of these agencies and enterprises still function today but have undergone 
significant changes in their regulatory structure. While these organizations were 
originally chartered as government agencies or enterprises, many were eventually 
"sold to private entities" entirely or "hybridized."56 As mentioned within this thesis, 
one of these entities that was created during the Depression era was the Federal 
National Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae), which became a full-fledged hybrid 
GSE in 1968. 57 
54 Koppell, 6. 
55 Moe, Emerging Federal, 294. 
56 Koppell, 6. 
57 Kwiatoski and Skriloff, 23. 
government's reliance on the utilization of hybrids for financing mortgages to 
maintaining public transit networks, "the combined liability of federal 
hybrids ... exceeds $2 trillion. "61 Simply stated by Moe (200 I), "There is nothing 
modest about the size, scope, and impact of the quasi-government."62 
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From this definition of a hybrid organization, one can narrow the definition of 
a GSE. Moe and Stanton (1989) describe a GSE as "a privately owned, federally 
chartered financial institution with nationwide scope and limited lending power that 
benefits from an implicit federal guarantee to enhance its ability to borrow money."63 
Moe (200 I) adds to this definition, writing "Congress created GS Es to help make 
credit more readily available to sectors of the economy believed to be disadvantaged 
in the credit markets (Stanton, 1991, 2001)."64 In the case of Fannie Mae and Freddie 
Mac, these GSEs help Americans gain access to the mortgage market and ultimately 
purchase a home. Specifically, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mae "issue capital stock and 
short- and long-term debt instruments, guarantee-mortgage backed securities," and 
"purchase loans and hold them in their own portfolios."65 
While it is necessary to understand what GSEs are, it is as vital, if not more 
vital, to understand what GSEs are not. By definition, GSEs are instrumentalities of 
the government and are not agencies. 66 Moe (2001) notes: 
61 Koppell, 2. 
62 Moe, Emerging Federal, 291. 
63 Moe and Stanton, 321 
64 Moe, Emerging Federal, 293. 
" Moe, Emerging Federal, 294. 
66 Moe, Emerging Federal, 291. 
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GS Es are instrumentalities, not agencies, of the United States - a 
legally and administratively important distinction .... An agency (as 
defined in Title 5) is managed directly through the federal 
management hierarchy. It is subject to all general management laws 
and regulations provided in the U.S. Code .... An instrumentality of 
government, on the other hand, is a privately owned institution that is 
not subject to any of the general management laws and regulations 
unless so indicated in its enabling legislation ( charter). 67 
Title 5 of the U.S. Code defines what constitutes an agency and the subsequent rules 
and regulations to which they must adhere. 68 On the contrary, the definition of 
instrumentalities in the context of GSEs lacks any basis in federal statute. Moe and 
Stanton (1989) clarify that "an instrumentality is a privately-owned institution that 
may be supervised but is not directly managed by the federal government. The 
federal government uses an instrumentality to carry out government purposes in 
addition to usual private purposes such as profit making for its owners."69 
Since GSEs are not agencies according to U.S. Code, they provide an 
alternative for the government to execute certain projects and programs that may not 
have otherwise been feasible. The devolution of formerly federal programs to state 
governments has "accelerated this trend" of utilizing GS Es. 70 Due in large part to 
this devolution, GSEs serve as a viable option for government for three main reasons. 
First, proponents of GSEs argue that these organizations "promise greater 
effectiveness than traditional governmental agencies at a lower cost to taxpayers." 
67 Moe, Emerging Federal, 295. 
68 Moe, Emerging Federal, 29 I. 
69 Moe and Stanton, 324. 
70 Johnston and Romzek, 94. 
Secondly, GSEs serve as a more "businesslike" alternative to traditional agencies. 71 
The drive to make government more efficient gained momentum in the 1990's with 
the National Performance Review and its calls for business sector concepts to be 
applied to the governmental sector. 72 Since GSEs are instrumentalities and are 
flexible organization, one writer notes: 
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[ ... ] the quasi-markets of the "reinvented" public sector constitute a 
realm of efficient and responsible service for consumers, while 
orthodox public service delivery systems ( especially local 
government) are dominated by political bias and manipulation. Public 
services ... "can be made responsive [only] by giving the public 
choices, or by instituting mechanisms which build in publicly-
approved standards and redress when they are not attained." 73 
This type of business-centric management of public programs will be addressed later 
in the thesis. Thirdly, these organizations are exempt from Security and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) regulation and state/local income taxes." Lastly, the implicit 
backing by the federal government attracts more reliance upon GSEs; "on average, 
the combined size of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac has more than doubled every five 
years since 1968."74 GSEs serve as an alternative to traditional government 
programs. By emphasizing "structural disaggregation" and the "creation of 'task 
specific' organizations; "performance contracting;" and "deregulation," various levels 
71 Koppell, 3. 
72 Andrew Graham and Alasdair Roberts, "The Agency Concept in North America - Failure, 
Adaptation, and Incremental Change," in Unbundled Government: A Critical Analysis of the Global 
Trend to Agencies, Quangos and Contractualisation, ed. Christopher Pollitt and Colin Talbot (New 
York: Routledge, 2004), 143. 
73 Stuart Weir, "From Strong Government and Quasi-Government to Strong Democracy," in 
Reinventing Democracy, ed. Paul Hirst and Sunil Khilnani (Cambridge: Blackwell, 1996), 22. 
74 Moe, Emerging Federal, 294. 
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of government are utilizing GSEs to achieve such goals. 75 Moe (200 I) identified four 
major reasons that have led to the proliferation of GSEs: 
I. Current controls on the federal budget process that encourage 
agencies to develop new sources of revenues; 
2. Desire by advocates of agencies and programs to be exempt from 
central management laws, especially statutory ceilings on personnel 
and compensation; 
3. Contemporary appeal of generic, business-focused values as the 
basis for a New Public Management; and 
4. Belief that management flexibility requires entity-specific laws and 
regulations, even at the cost of less accountability to representative 
institutions. 76 
As a corollary of reducing the size of the budget, some GS Es offer types of 
subsidies, which under a traditional federal program, would be included in a given 
budget. In the example of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, these "subsidies supposedly 
generate from the implicit federal backing by the federal government and are passed 
through to consumers "in the form oflower mortgages rates."77 
Though the size and scope of GSEs has increased over the last thirty years, a 
tenuous relationship has manifested itself between proponents of GS Es and their 
critics. It is common knowledge that the U.S. has been relying upon GSEs for the 
provision of public goods and services at an ever-increasing rate for the last three 
decades. Nevertheless, critics cite that this growing reliance on GSEs as a 
75 Colin Talbot, "The Agency Idea: Sometimes Old, Sometimes New, Sometimes Borrowed, 
Sometimes Untrue," in Unbundled Government: A Critical Analysis of the Global Trend to Agencies, 
Quangos and Contractualisation, ed. Christopher Pollitt and Colin Talbot (New York: Routledge, 
2004), 6. 
76 Moe, Emerging Federal, 290 -91. 
77 Moe, Emerging Federal, 294. 
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programmatic crutch has weakened the entirety of public administration. Koppell 
(2003) summarizes this concern of too much reliance on GSEs: 
... Critics of quasi-government claim that hybrids are simply beyond 
the control of elected officials, and, by extension, the public. In the 
rush to move government expenditures off-budget and bring 'market 
efficiency' into the public sector, policy responsibilities have been 
delegated to hybrids with little consideration of the potential political 
costs. Thus critical questions have gone unanswered - even 
unasked. 78 
Since most hybrids are relatively young entities, there has been little critical analysis 
of GSEs in the field of public administration. Even within the federal government, a 
lack of introspection of exactly what constitutes GSEs and hybrid organizations has 
further complicated matters. As Koppell notes, "Despite their popularity and 
importance, hybrids have not received much attention. Improbable as it may seem, 
no one knows just how many federal hybrids exist. This is a function of ambiguity, 
not secrecy." 79 As previously mentioned this "ambiguity" arises in large part due to a 
lack of a federal statute in the U.S. Code that formally defines an instrumentality. 
Even though this ambiguity of legal status may not bother individuals in government 
who come from a business background, this ambiguity proves most troublesome for 
academics in the field of public administration. Moe and Stanton ( 1989) argue that 
this ambiguity represents a direct threat to accountability in government. They write, 
"Ambiguity of legal status, however, is not a prerequisite for innovative management. 
Quite the contrary, ambiguity of legal status is an invitation to mismanagement and 
78 Koppell, 3. 
79 Koppell, 8. 
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the commingling of public and private interests, generally to the disadvantage of both 
parties."80 These words were echoed by Harold Seidman, who noted that 
"'Intermingling of public and private purposes in a profit making corporation almost 
inevitably means subordination of public responsibilities to corporate goals. We run 
the danger of creating a system in which we privatize profits and socialize losses' 
(Seidman 1998, 213)."81 
With the proliferation of hybrid organizations, GS Es have created another fold 
in the complex operations of the federal government; an arena where "today's 
administrators must function in a 'hollow state' with a core of public management 
surrounded by an array of cross-institutional, primarily extra-governmental ties 
(Milward and Provan 2000; O'Toole and Meier 1999; O'Toole 2000)."82 These 
"extra-governmental ties" can include the interests of national nonprofits, religious 
organizations, and powerful lobbyists and other representatives from the private 
sector. GSEs, while they can be more efficient in the provision of goods and services 
than traditional modes of government, do not offer and cannot offer the same types of 
accountability as traditional governmental agencies. The "traditional tools for 
holding executive agencies accountable (such as the budge and general management 
law)" usually do not apply to large, influential GSEs. 83 These issues of 
accountability have usually not been applied to the discourse of GSEs most likely due 
80 Moe and Stanton, 321. 
81 Moe, Emerging Federal, 295. 
82 Johnston and Romzek, 95. 
83 Moe, Emerging Federal, 290. 
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to the popular sentiment that the government needs to be more efficient; therefore, 
any changes that reduce red tape are welcome. Such a line of thought turns a blind 
eye to administrative structure of GSEs and now this structure creates benefits for 
these organizations that private enterprises do not enjoy. In addition, such a glib 
approval of GSEs shows that many Americans do not understand the actual origins of 
GSEs. While the average citizen has most likely heard of Fannie Mae or Freddie 
Mac, the average citizen either assumes that they are private companies or purely 
governmental agencies. The convoluted historical development of GSEs and their 
lack of basis in public and administrative law do not encourage open discourse of 
how these organizations lack accountability mechanisms that are present in most 
traditional governmental agencies. The simple matter is that GSEs are a different 
breed of animal-they are neither a purely private interest nor a governmental 
agency. Their presence occupies an idiosyncratic place in the discourse of public 
administration. While there are supporters and detractors of GSEs on either side of 
the argument, most public administrators and lawmakers would agree that since 
"GSEs have access to public funds through their ability to pledge the government's 
implicit guarantee.to back virtually any obligation they decide to incur ... they must be 
regulated or supervised if the federal government is to protect itself from potentially 
unlimited financial exposure. " 84 
Uitimately, GS Es play an invaluable role in the provision of governmental 
services. In the past, some staunch critics of GSEs attempted to abolish these 
84 Moe and Stanton, 322. 
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organizations from existence, arguing that "federally supported borrowing by 
GS Es ... distorted the allocation of financial resources and discouraged borrowers 
without access to federal subsidies."85 Obviously, such attempts of extinguishing 
GSEs have been met with little support from Congress. GSEs such as Fannie Mae 
and Freddie Mac have come to the fore in their provision of goods and services, even 
if the average citizen remains unaware of their administrative history or structure. In 
the end, to ensure that GSEs do not usurp their public purposes for private sector 
goals of profitability and/or its own institutional goals, the reality of the impact GS Es 
can have on the nation requires that lawmakers and public administrators reassess 
what the term accountability means and how that definition changes when it is 
confronted with a GSE. Prior to this assessment, administrators and managers must 
conduct some introspection and determine how their management paradigm colors 
their view on efficiency, the rule of law, government, and accountability. 
The Entrepreneurial Management Paradigm vs. the Constitutionalist 
Management Paradigm 
GSEs, by their form and function, represent a distinctive group of 
organizations. These organizations, chartered by Congress and/or the President, are 
operated by private individuals who seek a profit for their shareholders. While these 
organizations were founded to address certain issues in the public realm, they 
simultaneously espouse the capitalist mantra of finding new and more efficient ways 
of obtaining a profit. As mentioned previously, GSEs continue to grow in their 
85 Moe and Stanton, 322. 
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popularity because they are off-budget organizations that are flexible, cost-reducing, 
efficient organizations-all these adjectives embody the antithesis of traditional 
government programs. This intense focus on profitability, efficiency, output, results, 
and cost-cutting have permanently shaped the vocabulary of the public administrator. 
Paul Appleby made famous the succinct yet insightful phrase "Government is 
different." For many years, this statement had held its ground; there existed one set of 
theories and descriptors for the public/government sector, and there existed a distinct, 
separate set of theories and vocabulary for the business sector. The proliferation of 
GSEs has challenged this simple notion that government is, indeed, different after all. 
Does_ the presence of GSEs invite government to become better suited at its assorted 
functions? Do GSEs improve government? Is there really a difference between 
government behavior and business behavior? How society answers these questions 
will ultimately indicate how the federal government will evolve in the coming 
decades. 
Prior to the creation and growth of GSEs, many theorists would have agreed 
with Appleby-government is distinctively different from the private sector of free 
enterprise. Public administration theorists trace back this dichotomy in these two 
sectors to the founding of this nation. As Moe (200 I) observes, the basis for this 
distinction between the government and private sectors is founded in law. 86 
According to this theoretical framework known as the constitutionalist management 
paradigm, the government sector, which includes the various divisions of government 
86 Moe, Emerging Federal, 305. 
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regardless of horizontal and vertical divisions, is separate from the private sector 
because it has its basis in the Constitution and public law. 87 Government is different 
from business because 
[The] distinguishing characteristic of governmental management, 
contrasted with private management, is that government actions must 
have their basis in public law, not in the financial interests of private 
entrepreneurs or in the fiduciary concerns of corporate managers. The 
hierarchical structure found in the executive branch is designed more 
to ensure accountability for managerial actions; promoting control 
over employees is secondary. 88 
The constitutionalist management paradigm does not focus on "efficiency" or 
"output," but instead it focuses on establishing accountable management through the 
basis of constitutional and public law. This management paradigm is contrasted with 
what Moe (1995) labels as the entrepreneurial management paradigm. 
In contrast to the constitutional management paradigm, the entrepreneurial 
management paradigm has the "underlying premise that the government and private 
sectors are fundamentally alike and subject to most of the same economically derived 
behavioral norms (Kettl 2000; Schneider, Teske, and Minstrom 1995; Stretton and 
Orchard 1994 ). "
89 
The entrepreneurial management paradigm has existed in some 
form since the latter half of the twentieth century but gained prominence during the 
first term of President Clinton in the early 1990s. According to the National 
Performance Review (NPR), which was a "reform initiative begun by the Clinton 
administration, [it] proposed sweeping changes to laws governing personnel, 
87 Moe, Emerging Federal, 305. 
88 Moe, Emerging Federal, 305. 
89 Moe, Emerging Federal, 305. 
40 
procurement and budgeting within the executive branch of government (Gore 
1993)."90 Many of the changes proposed within the NPR derive their theoretical 
basis from the entrepreneurial management paradigm. According to the 
entrepreneurial management paradigm, "the principal, if not exclusive, objective is 
results, and this principle should be applied to the governmental sector as well."91 
One can observe this focus on efficiency and program outputs in the major themes of 
the NPR. Graham and Roberts (2004) write that this: 
New paradigm ... contained three major themes. The first was a desire 
to release public servants from a welter of rules that were thought to 
make public organizations inflexible and inefficient. The second was 
a renewed emphasis on the reporting of results achieved by public 
organizations, and the use of this data to levy rewards or penalties. A 
final theme was said to be a new pragmatism about the choice of 
institutional structures used to deliver public services. 92 
For the entrepreneurial management paradigm, government activities ought to 
be conducted like a business. The objectives of the entrepreneurial management 
paradigm as outlined by Moe and Gilmour ( 1995) summarize the main impetus 
behind this business-management approach to governmental management. These 
objectives include the casting aside of "red tape," ensuring customer satisfaction, 
promoting the decentralization of authority, and providing governmental programs 
that "work better and cost less" than traditional provision of goods and services. 93 
90 Graham and Roberts, I 42. 
91 Moe, Emerging Federal, 305. 
92 Graham and Roberts, 140. 
93 Ronald C. Moe and Robert S. Gilmour, "Rediscovering Principles of Public Administration: The 
Neglected Foundation of Public Law," Public Administration Review 55, no. 2 (March -April 1995): 
141-42 Douma! online]; available from <http://www.jstor.org/stable/977179>; accessed 16 February 
2009. 
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Moreover, within the NPR, former Vice-President Al Gore stated that "many of the 
service delivery functions within the federal government would be reorganized as 
'performance-based organizations,' or PBOs." Gore emphasized that regarding these 
PBOs that" ... we're going to toss out the restrictive rules that keep them from doing 
business like a business. All the red tape, personnel rules that keep managers from 
using people effectively, the budget restrictions that make planning or allocating 
resources almost impossible (NPR 1996c:7)."94 
The NPR report continues this emphasis on productivity and efficiency, 
stating that '"effective entrepreneurial governments cast aside red tape, shifting from 
systems in which people are accountable for following rules to systems in which they 
are accountable for achieving results' (NPR 1996c:6-7)."95 
The entrepreneurial management paradigm represents a dynamic change in 
the manner in which managers theorize how government functions and what 
objectives it should be achieving. Even the parlance of the entrepreneurial 
management paradigm differs significantly from the constitutionalist management 
paradigm; for example, the entrepreneurial management paradigm focuses on 
"customer satisfaction." Such a term would be extremely out of place in the 
constitutionalist management paradigm, where the main focus is on accountability of 
government programs based upon public law, not economic theory. 
94 Graham and Roberts, 143. 
95 Moe, Emerging Federal, 305. 
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While the entrepreneurial management paradigm represents a symbolic shift 
in the way in which governments utilize hybrid organizations in the provision of 
goods and services, its theoretical framework has come under fire for its lack of 
accountability. 96 Moe and Gilmour (1995) stated this criticism bluntly, writing, "The 
entrepreneurial management model is not and cannot be a substitute for political and 
legal accountability."97 Moe (2001) continues this criticism of the entrepreneurial 
management paradigm: 
Under the entrepreneurial management paradigm, the vision is to 
create a society of government/private partnerships based on 
pragmatics application of performance-oriented objectives, or what 
Harlan Cleveland (2000) approvingly refers to as the "nobody-in-
charge society" .... Those advocating entrepreneurial management tend 
to favor organizational disaggregation and managerial autonomy. 
Congress is viewed as a nuisance to be avoided, and central 
management agencies are to be stripped of much of their authority and 
capacity. 98 
Furthermore, "for constitutionalists, the quasi-government tends to represent a retreat 
from democratic values and accountable management."99 For many of the critics of 
the entrepreneurial management paradigm, the reliance on market measures to ensure 
efficiency and "outputs" provides no measures of actual managerial accountability. 
Economic theory does state that competition is good for the market because it 
increases efficiency, output, and lowers costs. While economic theory is compatible 
with the marketplace, it omits a key variable in its analysis of the entrepreneurial 
96 Graham and Roberts, 143. 
97 Moe and Gilmour, 143. 
98 Moe, Emerging Federal, 306. 
99 Moe, Emerging Federal, 306. 
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management paradigm: politicization. The entrepreneurial management paradigm's 
conception of accountability is very similar to the accountability model in 
government contracting: 
Traditional market models of contracting assume that contractors will 
be disciplined by market forces such as competition, ease of seller 
access to the contract market, and ready and inexpensive availability 
of relevant contract info and alternative providers. Accountability 
under such conditions relies on the market to ensure desirable 
behavior. A more common situation occurs under imperfect market 
conditions, or Sclar' s incomplete contract scenario, characterized by 
frequent transactions among contractual parties and high levels of 
uncertainty about future situations covered by the contract and about 
product and/or process. Accountability in this setting tends to generate 
contracts that grow exponentially in detail, a "contract fattening" 
process. 100 
In reality, perfect market conditions almost never exist. For this example, 
under imperfect conditions, government executives would not be able to dismantle 
one hybrid organization in exchange for another. As a hybrid organization comes 
into existence, it builds a constituency in addition to establishing its own institutional 
goals, which may or may not conflict with the program goals of the entrepreneurial 
management. Moreover, for the provision of many goods and services, the 
government acts as monopolist in certain markets where the high costs prevent the 
entry of competitors into that market. Although the entrepreneurial model boasts of 
the flexibility of making the government more businesslike, the entrepreneurial model 
seemingly ignores the presence of any interest groups involved with a given hybrid 
wo Johnston and Romzek, 95 - 96. 
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that may prevent the federal government from shuttering that particular hybrid and/or 
implementing a new hybrid organization. 
At the heart of this debate over which management paradigm government 
ought to pursue, polarization of the issue has muted much insightful dialogue from 
occurring between the proponents of each management paradigm. Supporters of the 
constitutionalist management paradigm desire for to sever the government's love 
affair with capitalist influences and return to its basis of constitutional and public law, 
all in effort to reestablish a dearth of managerial and programmatic accountability. 
On the contrary, proponents of the entrepreneurial management paradigm view a 
reliance on administrative law as restricting hybrid organizations from fully achieving 
their potential. In summary, many constitutionalists would wish to severely limit the 
growth and scope of hybrid organizations such as GSEs, while entrepreneurs desire to 
achieve accountability through market mechanisms. Gamble ( 1996) summarizes, 
"The difference between economic liberals and liberal collectivists is that the former 
believes that the best guarantee of that accountability is the protection of the 
institutional order of the market, while the latter place their faith in the institutional 
order of democratic government." 101 (Gamble 130). At the core of these disputes 
remains issue of accountability, but the mere identification of this core issue does 
little to clarify the issue further. What is accountability? In short, the answer to this 
question depends on exactly who is asked such a question. 
101 Andrew Gamble, "The Limits of Democracy," in Reinventing Democracy, ed. Paul Hirst and Sunil 
Khilnani (Cambridge: Blackwell, 1996), 130. 
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What is Accountability? 
If a person were to survey 100 random people, the chances are the surveyor 
would receive 100 different responses. The ironic fact of the matter is that in a time 
when the general public demands more accountability, no one can clearly articulate 
what it is exactly they mean when they demand more accountability. Concerned 
citizens and watchdog groups clamor for "More accountable schools!" and "More 
accountable government!" and "More accountable businesses!" Yet, few people stop 
and ask what they really mean when they say they want more accountability. The 
following section is an investigation into what various sectors of society consider to 
be accountability and how these preconceived notions affect the manner in which the 
public-at-large holds the government accountable for its actions. This action does not 
represent a trite, meaningless exercise in semantics-the implications of how a group 
conceives a word such as accountability has permanent effects on how government is 
conducted. 
A comprehensive analysis of accountability in American government and its 
associated agencies has its logical beginning in the examination of American 
federalism. The founders of the U.S. Constitution concurred that the most 
appropriate form of government to be had in the United States, given its unique 
resources, cultures, and history, was a federated form of government. In this type of 
federal government, each branch of government, including the executive, legislative, 
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and judicial branches, serve as a check and balance for the other branches of 
government. This system of checks and balances represents a case of what some 
would identify as internal accountability; i.e., each branch of the federal government 
depends upon the cooperation of the other branches in order to function. Beryl Radin 
summarizes this phenomenon in his text The Accountable Juggler: 
The structure of American government, based on the concept of shared 
powers between separate institutions, establishes the framework or 
design for any approach to accountability. In that structure, every 
actor or institution operates in a diffuse system where individuals and 
institutions are forced to accommodate one another. This Madisonian 
structure has been described as a "harmonious system of mutual 
frustration." 102 
In the federal system of government, the various branches must communicate, 
interact, and bargain with one another in order to enact policy change. The 
Constitution was especially designed to force such checking and bargaining. By no 
means is the Constitution a document written for reasons of efficiency-a 
government without these necessary checks leads itself towards tyranny, where 
accountability becomes a mere artifact of the past. 
Accountability is not Solely Controllability 
In his text The Politics of Quasi Government, Jonathan Koppell writes, "Some 
have argued that elected officials should always retain control over the unelected 
bureaucracy; at least as many have argued that bureaucratic discretion is a 
requirement for good governance. In much scholarship, however, this debate gets 
rn, Beryl A. Radin, The Accountable Juggler: The Art of Leadership in a Federal Agency (Washington, 
D.C.: CQ Press), 12. 
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papered over by the conflation of control and "'accountability."' 103 For many people, 
when asked what accountability means to them, they may state that accountability is 
having a manager or director having control over a given organization. To conflate 
the term accountability to mean control not only does a disservice to other potentially 
viable forms of accountability, such an action also ignores the presence of 
accountability in the American federalist system of government. In the federal 
government, the legislative branch cannot "control" the executive branch or vice 
versa. Accountability in this sense is the bargaining and compromising in which the 
three branches partake. 
While accountability is not solely control, control can serve as a shade or 
dimension of accountability. In this sense, accountability becomes like a diamond 
with numerous facets. The task that remains is to identify these other facets or layers 
of accountability and how they manifest themselves in the public sphere. Koppell 
(2003) identifies several popular conceptions of accountability. These conceptions of 
accountability are recreated in Table I below: 
103 Koppell, 181. 
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Table 1: Conceptions of Accountability. 104 
Conceution of Accountabilitv Key Determination 
Transparency Did the organization reveal the facts of its 
performance? 
Liability Did the organization face consequences 
for its performance? 
Controllability Did the organization do what the 
principal ( e.g., Congress, the President) 
desired? 
Resoonsibilitv Did the organization follow the rules? 
Responsiveness Did the organization fulfill the 
substantive expectation ( demand/need)? 
While controllability is a conception of accountability according to Table I, it alone 
does not tell the full story of accountability. Transparency, liability, controllability, 
responsibility, and responsiveness all are dimensions of accountability. Broadly 
speaking, accountability as conceptualized in Table I can be thought of as simply 
answerability. In this sense, "[accountability} means answerability for one's actions 
or behavior, often "to higher authorities including elected and appointed officials who 
sit at the apex of institutional chains of command and to directly involved 
stakeholders, for performance that involves delegation of authority to act" (Kearns, 
1996, p. 11). 105 Nevertheless, thinking of accountability simply as answerability 
does little to quell the debate over how the government should hold itself accountable 
for its actions. 
10
' Koppell, 181. 
'
0
' Lisa A. Dicke and J. Steven Ott, "Public Agency Accounting in Human Services Contracting," 
Public Productivity & Management Review 22, no. 4 (June 1999): 504 [journal online ]; available from 
<http://www.jstor.org/stable/976861>; accessed 16 February 2009. 
Conceiving accountability as answerability adds new dimensions to this 
analysis, but it alone does not suffice as an all-encompassing definition. Dicke and 
Ott (1999) cite that accountability as answerability includes five "often-competing 
structural dimensions ... that incorporate accountability for resources, performance, 
and outcomes of services." 106 Table 2 below shows a summary of these five 
dimensions of accountability: 
Table 2: Dimensions of Accountabilitv. 107 
Dimensions of Accountabilitv Central Themes 
Hierarchical Hierarchical relationships, close 
supervision. Compliance with clearly 
stated directives. 
Legal Tasks carried out in accordance with 
constitutional principles, Jaws or 
contractual obligations. Binding 
sanctions are available. 
Professional Discretion is exercised by those with 
expertise. Individual experts are 
answerable for their decisions and 
actions. 
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Political Demand for responsiveness. Satisfaction 
of key stakeholders; clientele-centered 
management. 
Moral and Ethical Standards of good behavior arise from 
conscience, organizational norms, 
standards, and concern for the general 
welfare. 
Dicke and Ott's (1999) analysis of accountability in the public sector extends the 
definition of accountability beyond simple control by a manager. When applied to 
the provision of public goods and services, accountability becomes more than simply 
106 Dicke and Ott, 504 - 505. 
107 Dicke and Ott, 504 - 505. 
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control; accountability becomes a " ... moral, professional, and ethical construct that 
results when public officials and contractors serve with a commitment to do the right 
things." 108 While this analysis by Koppell (2003) and Dicke and Ott (1999) 
illuminate the numerous layers of meaning of the term "accountability," the question 
remains: how does government ensure accountability in its actions? 
Perhaps a more appropriate question to ask is: How does the government 
ensure accountability in the provision of goods and services considering their reliance 
on hybrid organizations such as GSEs? As most scholars and critics agree, the 
government's reliance on hybrids in the provision of services has resulted in a loss of 
control. Koppell (2003) writes, "The core conclusion ... is that reliance on hybrid 
organizations does result in a loss of control. ... However, it is not a conclusion that 
renders that idea of quasi-government inimical to democracy." 109 Controllability 
lacks force as an accountability measure in reference to hybrids. Congress has a 
difficult time in regulating hybrids because the "(!) difficulty in measuring both costs 
and benefits of hybrid programs; (2) hybrids' off-budget status; (3) Congress' 
reliance on regulatory agents; (4) conflict among hybrids' objectives; and (5) the 
political influence ofhybrid organizations." 110 Some of the reasons of why the 
government instituted hybrids in the first place are a double-edged sword-these 
same reasons are the reasons why accountability as controllability does not hold for 
these GSEs. Controllability does not apply well for instrumentalities where there 
108 Dicke and Ott, 504. 
'
09 Koppell, 182. 
11° Koppell, 140. 
exists an unclear line of accountability. For controllability to be a useful dimension 
of accountability, "Ideally, lines of accountability should be direct and 
unambiguous." 111 
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These direct and unambiguous lines of accountability can be found primarily 
in executive level agencies. Regarding these agencies, the government can exert high 
degrees of controllability by utilizing administrative and regulatory control tools such 
as legislation, the budget process, appointment and confirmation, executive orders, 
oversight, federal management laws, monitoring, sanctions and remedies, and 
litigation and mediation. 112 The traditional view of accountability as controllability 
relies on several methods to ensure accountability. One of the most popular methods 
used by officials to ensure accountability in government is auditing, which is "a 
systematic control-oriented process assessment to evaluate the match or discrepancy 
between an established standard and the existing condition." 113 A shortcoming of 
audit-based verifications is that audits are retrospective and depend upon an 
established framework for their proper analysis. Audits provide little guidance in 
making proactive managerial decisions when confronted with an alien policy 
environment. Monitoring is a secondary measuring for ensuring accountability. In 
contrast to audits, "monitoring is ongoing oversight conducted during the 
performance ofa contract." 114 
111 Moe and Stanton, 324. 
112 Koppell, 38-44. 
113 Dicke and Ott, 506. 
114 Dicke and Ott, 506. 
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On the contrary, the proliferation of hybrid organizations within the 
government has forever changed the ways in which government officials achieve and 
verify accountability. This change could represent a paradigm shift from 
accountability as controllability to other dimensions of accountability: 
Far too much attention has been paid to traditional or compliance 
accountability and process accountability, and far too little 
to ... managerial accountability (which focuses on the judicious use of 
public resources), program accountability (which is concerned with the 
outcomes or results of government operations), and social 
accountability (which attempts to determine the social impacts of 
governmental programs) .... But overdependence on controls means 
that other e~ually significant dimensions of accountability may be 
neglected. 11 
Moreover, relying on accounting measures to ensure accountability has its limits, 
whether they are used to verify accountability for traditional governmental agencies 
or for recent GS Es. Miller ( 1996) extrapolates on these limitations of accounting 
standards when he writes, "If accountants are to continue to play an ever-increasing 
role in managing the new public sectors, it is important to identify the limits of their 
expertise." 116 He continues his critique by quoting Johnson and Kaplan in their book 
Relevance Lost, who write, "Today's management accounting information[ ... ] is too 
late, too aggregated, and too distorted to be relevant for managers' planning and 
control decisions." 117 Accountants, like any professional, are confined to the 
theoretical framework of their particular field. Professional and interest groups such 
115 Dicke and Ott, 512,514. 
116 Peter Miller, "Dilemmas of Accountability: The Limits of Accounting," in Reinventing Democracy, 
ed. Paul Hirst and Sun ii Khilnani (Cambridge: Blackwell, I 996), 61. 
117 Miller, 61. 
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as the AICPA define industry best-practices and establish uniform standards for 
certified public accountants. On the other hand, uncertainty exists even in the field of 
accounting. Judgments are based off the previous year's data, whose data was based 
upon the year prior to that. Miller concludes, "For if accountants continue to have 
difficulty in measuring precisely product costs, or in valuing accurately particular 
types of investment in the private sector, it is likely that such issues will prove even 
more difficult to resolve in the world of the public sector where goals are more 
ambiguous and multiple constituencies have to be served ... " 118 
Ultimately, the new demands for accountability measures that GSEs bring 
with their proliferation require a thorough reevaluation of what officials have 
traditionally considered to be measures of accountability. While some critics believe 
that "a good part of the quasi-governments appeal, and of its growth" is its lack of 
accountability, supporters of GSEs and other hybrids contend that such critics are 
attempting to apply twentieth-century accountability techniques to address twenty-
first century problems. 119 Specifically, for GSEs, one must take into account their 
influence over constituencies when attempting to enact accountability measures. As 
Koppell (2003) notes, "Structures led by a single individual are more likely to take 
decisive action and challenge an influential hybrid organization than a regulatory 
agency led by a multi-member commission." 12° Congress adopted this plan to reign 
in Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac when it abolished the OFHEO and put into place a 
118 Miller, 66. 
119 Moe, Emerging Federal, 291. 
120 Koppell, 162. 
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Director of the Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA). With the growth ofGSEs, 
public administrators and other officials must realize that controllability alone cannot 
guarantee proper accountability for these new hybrids. Accountability in these 
circumstances is truly a juggling process, where it "moves far beyond formal 
processes associated with control. ... Thus accountability in the federal government in 
the twenty-first century requires public sector leaders who are able to juggle multiple 
pressure, actors, and processes." 121 To hold GSEs accountable, administrators must 
recognize the multiple facets and dimensions of accountability. These administrators 
must be willing to consider that controllability alone does not equate to 
accountability. While controllability is a valid form of accountability, administrators 
must recognize the transparency, liability, hierarchical, legal, professional, political, 
and moral and ethical aspects of accountability. Miller intimates towards this 
reevaluation of accountability when he states, "Instead of asking how we might 
calculate the performance bonus to be awarded to a manager, we should ask what 
type of an organization is desired, what type of goals are to be fostered." 122 In 
summary, effective accountability and management of GS Es is "more than simple 
control; it is also capacity building." 123 
121 Radin, 22 - 23. 
122 Miller, 67. 
123 Moe and Stanton, 324. 
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A "Clash of Cultures" 
Much of the current debate over GSEs can be boiled down to issues of 
democracy, accountability, popular sovereignty, and public management. The 
general opinion of the ardent critics of GSEs is that their presence within the 
government of the US represents a direct and immediate threat to all of these themes. 
One of the strongest criticisms ofGSEs is that these organizations lack any basis in 
public law as to their origin. While numerous acts of Congress and the executive 
have chartered individual GSEs and other hybrids to address specific issues, no law 
has been written in the U.S. Code that addresses these instrumentalities in general. 
The glaring omission of GSEs and other instrumentalities in public law represents a 
potential threat to the safeguards put in place by public law; Moe and Gilmour (1995) 
address the importance of public law when they write, "Public law is the under-
appreciated 'cement' that binds the separated powers of the administrative state, 
ensures political and legal accountability of its officials, and restrains abuses of 
administrative discretions and conflicts ofinterest." 124 On the contrary, many of the 
supporters of GSEs view these instrumentalities in the lenses of the entrepreneurial 
management paradigm. For these proponents of GS Es, these instrumentalities are 
now an integral piece of government. They provide alternatives to the tired, 
inefficient agency system of the federal government and usher in efficient use of 
resources and increased "outputs." 125 GSEs reduce red tape and make government 
124 Moe and Gilmour, 138. 
125 Moe, Emerging Federal, 293. 
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work "better." These organizations are flexible and can easily adjust to dynamic 
environments. For these individuals of the entrepreneurial management paradigm, 
public law is not an essential component in order for these GSEs to accomplish their 
task. 
As scholars have indicated, what has occurred is a "fundamental clash of 
cultures ... between the legal and business cultures for acceptance of their principles 
by the government management community." 126 Represented by the constitutional 
management paradigm and the entrepreneurial management paradigm, these two 
"cultures" are at odds with one another. Simply put, the private sector and public 
sector have their origins in "fundamentally different streams of legal doctrine: one 
traditionally rooted in judge-made common law, protecting rights and asserting duties 
in the relations of private individuals; the other founded on the body of the 
Constitution and the Bill of Rights and articulated by a truly enormous body of 
statutory, regulatory, and case law .... " 127 In effect, what has occurred at the federal 
government with the proliferation of GSEs has been in effect a zero-sum game; i.e., 
the rise of the influence of the private sector into governmental management has 
resulted in a proportional disregard for the constitutional origins of public 
administration. In the eyes of many, the field of public administration "has largely 
abandoned or forgotten its roots in public law-in the Constitution, statutes, and case 
126 Moe and Gilmour, 142. 
127 Moe and Gilmour, 135. 
law-and has accepted, to varying degrees, the generic behavioral principles of 
management as taught in schools ofbusiness." 128 
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Moreover, the two competing paradigms treat the presence of each paradigm 
in government management as almost mutually exclusive. To the entrepreneurial 
management paradigm, inefficiencies are unnecessary and should be done away in an 
effort to streamline government functions and increase output. Alternatively, for the 
constitutionalist management paradigm, some inefficiencies are a necessary 
component of public management. As Madison wrote, such inefficiencies can serve 
as a safeguard from the "accumulations of all power, legislative, executive, and 
judiciary in the same hands" that could lead to "the very definition oftyranny." 129 
With the continuous proliferation of GSEs at the federal level, many critics 
fear that the President has slowly relinquished his duties as chief executive or "chief 
manager." The rise of the entrepreneurial management paradigm has created a 
"system of management by exceptions, a system where agencies, interest groups, and 
Congressional committees can join together at the expense of the President and the 
collective interests of the executive branch." 130 Up until the 1950s, the President had 
acted "chief manager" for the administrative system. Through the late 1960s into the 
· 1970s, the President gradually lost this role as the federal government began to rely 
128 Moe and Gilmour. 135. 
129 Moe and Gilmour, 136. 
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0 Ronald C. Moe, "The HUD Scandal and the Case for an Office of Federal Management," Public 
Administration Review 51, no, 4 (July-August 1991): 301 [journal online]; available from 
<http://www.jstor.org/stable/976745>; accessed 16 February 2009. 
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more on the private sector and instrumentalities like GSEs. 131 In addition, the Office 
of Management and Budget (0MB) has displaced management priorities for budget 
priorities, and it has done this for quite some time. 132 The gradual eroding of the 
emphasis on constitutional law and the managerial capacity of the President and 
0MB has created a federal government that has forgotten its origins. 
Why does this all matter? Why should concerned citizens be hesitant to 
embrace a management paradigm that has no basis in constitutional law? For many 
scholars and, supporters of the entrepreneurial management paradigm, what has been 
occurring over the last thirty years at the federal level simply appears to be a natural 
evolution of government. With the increasing demands placed on the federal 
government by the public, the government had to find alternative methods to 
addressing these social issues. Many of these issues were the "political 
consequences" of a "free unfettered market economy." While traditional 
governmental agencies provided some relief to these issues, the federal government 
began to tum to market economy itself as a solution to amend the negative 
externalities created by the market itself. 133 Citizens should be concerned about the 
increasing presence of the private sector and GSEs in the federal government because 
history has shown that privatization is not democracy. Benjamin Barber (1996) 
writes: 
131 Moe, Emerging Federal, 292. 
132 Ronald C. Moe, "Traditional Organizational Principles and the Managerial Presidency: From 
Phoenix to Ashes," Public Administration Review 50, no. 2 (March -April 1990): 133 [journal online]; 
available from <http://www.jstor.org/stable/976861>; accessed 16 February 2009. 
133 Gamble, 119. 
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The disastrous consequences that follow from patterning political 
reforms on macro-economic theory are patently visible in countries 
from Russia to Latin America and Africa, where according to 
Guillermo O'Donnell, a leading Latin American political scientist, "as 
the private sphere flourishes ... the public sphere crumbles." To him, 
the matter is simple: privatization is not democratization. Period. 134 
The infusing of private sector thinking into the level of the federal government that 
goes unchecked creates the glaring absence of accountability. Without a basis in law, 
instrumentalities such as GSEs only answer to rule of economists. This danger of an 
unchecked deference to pragmatism and dealing with issues on an "ad hoc basis" 
makes it extremely difficult for government administrators, including Congress and 
the President, "to impose accountability, especially if opposed by parties interested in 
lax oversight." 135 
Conclusion 
The U.S. government has undoubtedly reached a defining moment in its 
administrative history. The increasing reliance on GS Es such as Fannie Mae and 
Freddie Mac has forever changed the ways in which the federal government ensures 
the provision of certain public goods and services. These instrumentalities and others 
like them have become an integral part of the federal government and its daily 
operations. While instrumentalities have been lauded by some members of Congress 
for their flexibility and responsiveness in addressing critical social issues, these very 
organizations can pose a threat to the legal foundations of this nation. Critics are 
134 Barber, Benjamin, "Three Challenges to Reinventing Democracy," in Reinventing Democracy, ed. 
Paul Hirst and Sunil Khilnani (Cambridge: Blackwell, 1996), 154. 
135 Moe and Stanton, 324. 
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correct in stating that ambiguous accountability resulting from the proliferation of 
GSEs is a threat to the U.S. system of federalism, governmental accountability, 
popular sovereignty, and democracy. Supporters of the constitutionalist management 
and entrepreneurial management paradigms are equally vocal in their raucous 
condemnation of the opposing paradigm. Strong supporters of the constitutionalist 
management paradigm desire to sever ties completely with GSEs, hybrids, or any 
instrumentalities that lack basis in public law. In contrast, supporters of the 
entrepreneurial management paradigm feel that not enough is being done at the 
government level to promote instrumentalities as effective means of achieving 
program outputs. For these individuals, the capitalist market is the solution to the 
problems of a bloated federal budget and ineffective government agencies. 
The simple fact of the matter is that GS Es and other instrumentalities have 
become too entrenched in the everyday operations of the federal government for them 
to be completely removed and carved out of the government's psyche. GSEs like 
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac have created powerful interest groups that (legally) 
lobby Congress in an effort to influence certain legislation. This fact does not mean 
that reform is impossible and governmental reform is a lost cause: 
Not long ago, Peter Drucker wrote that "Any organization, whether 
biological or social. .. needs to rethink itself once it is more than forty 
or fifty years old. It has outgrown its policies and its rules of behavior. 
If it continues in its old ways, it becomes ungovernable, 
unmanageable, uncontrollable." 136 
136 William V. Roth, Jr., foreword to Terminating Public Programs: An American Political Paradox, 
by Mark R. Daniels (New York: M.E. Sharpe, 1997), xvi. 
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If left unchecked, GSEs and other instrumentalities could reach a point where these 
organizations do become ungovernable, unmanageable, and uncontrollable. Even 
though many critics have called for the reform of GSEs, little has been suggested in 
the way of actual reform. The overly-technical functions of GSEs and their lack of 
media attention do not warrant the same type of fervent calls for reform that other 
governmental programs receive from the public. Nevertheless, the accountability of 
government depends on several necessary steps that must be taken to reform and 
regulate GSEs and other instrumentalities. 
First and foremost, laws must be incorporated in the body of the U.S. Code 
that specifically addresses instrumentalities, their forms, and their functions in the 
federal government. "[A] generic law providing for comprehensive regulations of 
GSEs and clarifying their status as instrumentalities rather than agencies of the United 
States" would resemble legislation similar to Title 5 of the U.S. Code that concerns 
agencies. 137 By codifying instrumentalities into public law, government managers, 
Congress, the President, the judiciary, and the citizens would have a written 
document explaining what instrumentalities are and explaining their intended 
functions. A legal document would formally define the limitations, expectations, 
appropriate administrative structures, and other specificities of GSEs that are 
currently lacking in the U.S. Code. 
The Housing and Economic Recovery Act of2008 signals a shift in the 
appropriate direction for regulation ofGSEs and other hybrids by Congress. For the 
137 Moe and Stanton, 327. 
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first time, a legal document drafted by Congress sets forth specific restrictions and 
rules on the operations of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. On the contrary, such 
specific legislation cannot regulate all GSEs. Even though the Housing and 
Economic Recovery Act of 2008 brought considerable attention to the impact that 
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac have on the nation, the legislation was not designed to 
become an expansive regulatory law for all GSEs and government instrumentalities. 
As indicated by others critics, generic laws dictating the boundaries of GSEs will not 
only protect the federal government, but these laws will also safeguard the private 
sector and the citizens. 
Regarding GSE reforms, government managers must look beyond 
controllability as accountability as the only measure to ensure program compliance 
for GSEs and other instrumentalities. Although direct control management represents 
a valid form of accountability in the government setting, the face of the federal 
government has changed substantially since the beginning of the twentieth century. 
Gone are the days ofTaylorism and scientific management, where line managers 
possessed direct control over outputs in a given bureaucracy. Today, the policy 
environment for governmental organizations constitutes more than just the 
governmental entity and the citizenry. Now, government administrators must face 
numerous policy actors, such as interest groups, nonprofit organizations, the private 
sector, and international governments, and confront numerous policy issues. 
Moreover, to become an effective manager, an administrator must acknowledge the 
multiple policy streams in the environment and devise a plan to find certain 
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"windows of opportunity," to use the words of Kingdon. By recognizing the policy 
interests of the public sector and the private sector, effective managers can hopefully 
construct a policy that addresses the needs of each sector to some degree. 
While reconciling multiple policy streams is an arduous yet rewarding task, 
government administrators must be cognizant of the demands of the other types of 
accountability-the hierarchical, legal, professional, political, moral and ethical 
attributes of program accountability. This last attribute, moral and ethical 
accountability, has the greatest impact on how various organizations contribute to 
their own capacity building. When organizations are mindful of the demands of 
moral and ethical accountability, these organizations construct an organization that 
recognizes the multiple commitments it has to itself and the people it serves. 
Capacity building occurs when administrators define the characteristics that their 
organization will represent. Capacity building is simply creating the organization one 
desires to create. Effective management seeks to go beyond controllability as 
accountability and create an ethos of moral and ethical accountability within their 
organization. Government administrators ought to recognize the multiple facets of 
accountability and realize their ethical responsibility to society in general. In regards 
to capacity building, Moe and Stanton (1989) write: 
Management is more than simple control; it is also capacity building. 
Management law, interpreted and administered with care, should 
permit the agency or instrumentality to perform its public 
responsibilities more effectively, not just more economically. Generic 
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laws, properly written, provide a means to implement a comprehensive 
managerial strategy. 138 
Ultimately, the federal government of the U.S. must actively pursue measures 
to regulate the function and reach of GSEs and instrumentalities. Without a doubt, 
these organizations play a crucial role in providing for numerous public goods and 
services that may otherwise not have been provided. In contrast, Congress and the 
President must not be too quick to embrace the creeping of the private sector into the 
public sector. The private and public sectors have their legal origins in two divergent 
bodies oflaw, and each sector has its own theory of behavior. Accountability suffers 
when government administrators fail to recognize this distinction. Unrestrained 
privatization of governmental functions represents a threat to federalism and popular 
sovereignty. On the contrary, administrators cannot dismiss the potential benefits of 
incorporating private sector thinking into solving public sector problems. In the end, 
one of the keys to this dilemma is to recognize the limitations of each sector and its 
theory: 
Renewing democracy in this perspective is about recognizing the 
limits to democracy but also the limits to markets, and no longer 
supposing that political virtue consists in a triumph of the one over the 
other .... Decentralized markets joined with associative democracy 
offer mechanisms of exit and voice which are both egalitarian and 
libertarian. The renewal of democracy requires a release of social 
energy and social imagination, a synergy which new forms of 
governance and new kinds of markets might provide. 139 
138 Moe and Stanton, 324. 
139 Gamble, 130. 
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This "synergy" of the private and public sectors can potentially yield great outcomes 
for the federal government. Nevertheless, the tenets of federalism that have provided 
checks and balances for over two hundred years, along with active public 
administrators, must provide the appropriate oversight of this synthesis. The U.S. 
simply cannot afford to sacrifice accountability for efficiency. 
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